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A CANCER ON THE INTERNET:
A PROPOSAL FOR STATUTORY REGULATION OF
INSURRECTIONIST SPEECH ON THE WEB
Sean August Camoni

I.

∗

INTRODUCTION

Skinheads have YouTube channels. Secessionists maintain Facebook pages. The Internet is a vast, largely unregulated universe
where anyone can say anything at anytime and remain anonymous if
he or she wishes. The Internet has expanded educational and communication opportunities in ways and to places never before imagined. It has exploded new economic frontiers, resulting in the facilitation of business and advertisement for millions. But the Internet
can also be a very dangerous place, rife with hate speech, identity
theft, fraud, sexual predators, and other illicit activities. The virtually
unlimited audience for websites, the low cost of producing and publishing content, and the ability to remain anonymous as a speaker or
listener all are factors that make the Internet an ideal place for those
who hold radical beliefs to recruit others to aid in their causes.
In the wake of the attempted assassination of Congresswoman
1
Gabrielle Giffords in Tucson, Arizona, former Alaska Governor Sarah Palin was criticized for a map of the United States, posted online
during the 2008 elections, with gunsights drawn over contested congressional districts, including Congresswoman Giffords’ district as
2
well as her name. There is no evidence that Palin’s map, or her online exhortation to fellow conservatives not to “retreat,” but to “rel∗

J.D. Candidate, Seton Hall University Law School, May 2011; B.A.H., 1999, Villanova University.
1
Marc Lacey and David M. Herszenhorn, In Attack’s Wake, Political Repercussions,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/01/09/us/politics/09giffords.html.
2
Brian Montopoli and Robert Hendin, Sarah Palin Criticized over Gabrielle Giffords
Presence on “Target List,” POLITICAL HOTSHEET, CBS NEWS (Jan. 8, 2011, 7:16 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20027918-503544.html?tag=content
Main;contentBody; see also Jillian Rayfield, Palin Uses Crosshairs to Identify Dems Who
Voted for Health Care Reform, TPM (March 24, 2010), http://tpmlivewire.
talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/03/palin-uses-crosshairs-to-identify-dems-who-votedfor-health-care-reform.php.
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oad,” at all influenced the Tucson gunman, Jared Lee Loughner.
But the nationwide discussion of violent public rhetoric that occurred
in the aftermath of the shooting cast a spotlight on the dangers of inciteful speech on the internet.
In April 2009, the Department of Homeland Security released a
report warning of the rising danger of right-wing extremism in the
4
United States. The report warned that the economic downturn,
coupled with the election of the first African-American President, was
creating a “fertile recruiting environment” for white supremacist and
5
antigovernment groups. These groups “gain new recruits by playing
6
on their fears.” The report stated that in the 1990s, similar groups
and a similar political and economic climate “contributed to the
growth in the number of domestic right-wing terrorist and extremist
groups and an increase in violent acts,” including the 1995 bombing
7
of the Oklahoma City Federal Building. The report points out that
military veterans returning from war, who already “face significant
challenges in reintegrating into their communities,” have “combat
8
skills and experience” that make them attractive recruitment targets.
The Department of Homeland Security “is concerned that right wing
extremists will attempt to recruit and radicalize returning veterans in
order to boost their violent capabilities,” which could lead to “the potential emergence of terrorist groups or lone wolf extremists capable
9
of carrying out violent attacks.”
The Internet is the most powerful tool available to these groups
by which they can recruit new members. The inability of current First
Amendment jurisprudence to account for the type of communication
performed on the Internet hampers the regulation of Internet
speech. The federal government should be able to regulate speech
on the Internet when that speech advocates criminal acts. Congress
should enact a statutory scheme granting law enforcement greater

3

Id.
See U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS,
RIGHTWING EXTREMISM: CURRENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CLIMATE FUELING
RESURGENCE IN RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT (2009), available at
www.fas.org/irp/eprint/rightwing.pdf [hereinafter RIGHTWING EXTREMISM].
5
Id. at 2.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id. at 2–3.
9
Id.
4
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power to head off violent acts like those anticipated by the DHS re10
port.
There is no constitutional guarantee of unfettered access to the
Internet for those who would use that medium to advocate unlawful
acts or recruit supporters to join them in committing acts of violence.
Freedom to speak is not the same as the right to a megaphone. If,
however, the First Amendment is to have any meaning at all, then we
must protect even that speech which is most offensive to us. We must
11
preserve “freedom for the thought that we hate.”
This Comment will argue that Congress should expand 18
U.S.C. § 1717, which prohibits the dissemination of materials advocating for or urging insurrection or other violations of U.S. law through
the mail, to also prohibit such communications via the Internet, and
that such an expansion would not run afoul of First Amendment protections of free speech. Part II presents a case study of examples of
secessionist speech taken from Texas in the summer and fall of 2009.
Part III sets forth the current state of First Amendment jurisprudence
as it pertains to subversive speech, particularly the Brandenburg Doctrine and the difficulties in applying Brandenburg in an Internet context. Part IV examines § 1717, which renders insurrectionist materials non-mailable and makes the case for a similar provision to
regulate the Internet. Part IV also proposes new statutory language
and analyzes the case examples from Part II under the proposed regulation. In implementing this type of regulation, Congress should, as
always when regulating speech, draw the statute narrowly so as not to
chill legitimate speech on the Internet. The balance that must be
struck is delicate indeed.
II. CASE STUDY IN INSURRECTIONIST SPEECH ON THE INTERNET:
TEXAS SECESSIONISTS
12

“I may run for president of Texas.” Chuck Norris is toying with
a run at the highest office in the land, and is not deterred in the least
by the fact that the land, an independent Republic of Texas, does not

10

The DHS report cites possible “violent acts targeting government facilities, law
enforcement officers, banks, and infrastructure sectors,” made more dangerous by
“high volume purchasing and stockpiling of weapons,” as the types of acts anticipated. RIGHTWING EXTREMISM, supra note 4, at 2, 3.
11
United States v. Schwimmer, 279 US 644, 655 (1929).
12
Chuck Norris, I May Run for President of Texas, WORLDNETDAILY.COM (March 9,
2009), http://www.wnd.com/index.php?fa=PAGE.view&pageId=91103.
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currently exist. The Delta Force star and “Total Gym” pitchman
thinks an independent Texas may be a reality soon, born of necessity,
he argues, “if the state of the union continues to turn into the enemy
15
of the state.” Citing the then two-month-old Obama Administration’s deficit spending policies, Norris suggested that secession may
be the only solution for downtrodden states and that Texas was the
16
most likely candidate to begin the exit parade. “Anyone who has
been around Texas for any length of time knows exactly what we’d do
17
if the going got rough in America.” According to Chuck Norris,
18
when the going gets rough in America, Texas leaves. Norris is no
19
“Lone Wolf McQuaid” on secession, however, as the Governor of
Texas echoed Norris’s sentiments soon after.
The month after Norris threw his hat into the non-existent ring
on Fox News’s Glenn Beck Show, Texas Governor Rick Perry told
several thousand protestors that he too sees secession as a not-too20
distant possibility. On Tax Day, April 15, 2009, Governor Perry addressed several so-called “Tea Party” protests, comprised of crowds of
Republicans, conservatives, and libertarians bearing “Don’t Tread on
Me” flags and signs with anti-Socialism, anti-Communism, and anti21
Obama slogans. Perry faced the crowds, who held signs that read,
“Liar in Chief” and “I’ll Keep My Guns and Money, You Keep the
Change,” and told them that he did not consider them to be “right22
23
wing extremists.”
But he confided, “if you are, I’m with you.”
24
Some among the throng shouted, “Secede!” In Austin, Perry told
the tea partiers that the federal government is “rampaging through
the halls of Congress” and that Washington needs to “re-read the
13

See The Delta Force, INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/
title/tt0090927/ (last visited Dec. 24, 2009).
14
See TOTAL GYM, http://www.totalgymdirect.com/?key=EFI (last visited Dec. 24,
2009).
15
Norris, supra note 12.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
See Lone Wolf McQuaid, INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/
title/tt0085862/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2009).
20
See Dave Levinthal and Gromer Jeffers Jr., Thousands Show up for Dallas ‘Tea Party’; Rick Perry Fires Up Rallies, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (April 16, 2009),
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/latestnews/stories/041509dnm
etteaparties.d8880855.html.
21
See id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
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25

Constitution.” The alternative for Texas, he said, might just be to
26
leave.
After the speech in Austin, Perry was asked if he agreed with
27
those in the crowd who advocated secession from the Union. He
answered, “There’s absolutely no reason to dissolve it. But if Washington continues to thumb their nose at the American people, you
28
know, who knows what might come out of that.”
Perry’s stance on secession is problematic for two reasons. First,
Texas secession under current circumstances is entirely impracticable
29
for financial reasons. That fact robs the Governor’s rhetoric of any
25

Id.
Levinthal, supra note 20.
27
See id.
28
Id. Perry waffled on this point in a Fox News interview on May 14, telling Neil
Cavuto that he never said that Texas should secede. Ryan Powers, Perry Again Refuses
to
Reject
Secession,
THINK PROGRESS
(May
14,
2009,
8:37
PM),
http://thinkprogress.org/2009/05/14/perry-secession/. According to Perry, what
he really meant was, “We live in a great country . . . and I saw no reason at all for us
to be even talking about seceding, but if Washington continues to force these programs on the states, if Washington continues to disregard the Tenth Amendment,
who knows what happens.” Id. This equivocation was followed three days later by an
editorial that backpedalled even harder:
I can’t say I was surprised that critics worked so hard to recast my defense of federalism and fiscal discipline into advocacy for secession
from the Union. Of course, I have never advocated for secession and
never will. Like the President, members of Congress and every other
state governor, I have sworn oaths to our nation and Constitution. My
sincere pledge to uphold and defend the Constitution has fueled my
concern and my statements about the recent unprecedented expansion
of our federal government.
Press Release, Gov. Rick Perry, Reflections on a Raging Debate (May 17, 2009), available at http://governor.state.tx.us/news/editorial/12389/.
29
Texans paid $86,612,253,000 in individual federal income tax in 2007, the
most recent year available. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX YEAR 2007: HISTORICAL
TABLE 2, SOI BULLETIN (2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/
article/0,,id=171535,00.html (click on TX in map). Overall federal expenditures in
Texas in 2008 totaled $392,100,177,745. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CONSOLIDATED
FEDERAL FUNDS REPORT 2008, available at http://www.census.gov/govs/cffr/ (choose
“Texas” in dropdown menu, then click “Go”). That means Texas took 3.5 times as
much money out of the pot as it put in. State and local sales taxes in Texas were projected to generate only $77.5 billion for 2008–09. Susan Combs, TX Comptroller,
Texas Taxes, WINDOW ON STATE GOV’T, http://www.window.state.tx.us/taxes/ (last
visited Mar. 28, 2011). Texas has no state income tax with which to regain any portion of the remaining shortfall if they did secede. Id. Even if the state implemented
an income tax, it would need to collect $10,374.17 from every man, woman, and
child, assuming that the entire population remains in an independent Texas.
POPULATION DIVISION, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE 1: ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE
POPULATION FOR COUNTIES OF TEXAS: APRIL 1, 2000 TO JULY 1, 2007 (CO-EST2007-0148) (2008), available at http://www.census.gov/popest/counties/tables/COEST2007-01-48.xls (projected 2007 population of Texas was 23,904,380). That is
26
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real threat. The second problem for Perry’s position is that secession
30
is unconstitutional and therefore a violation of U.S. law. In the
landmark case of Texas v. White, the Supreme Court ruled that when
Texas and other southern states seceded to form the confederacy,
their actions had absolutely no legal effect on the union under the
31
Constitution. The Court held that by the Articles of Confederation,
“the Union was solemnly declared to ‘be perpetual.’ . . . [T]he Constitution was ordained ‘to form a more perfect Union.’ It is difficult
to convey the idea of indissoluble unity more clearly than by these
words. What can be indissoluble if a perpetual Union, made more
32
perfect, is not?” The union between Texas and the other states was
no less indissoluble than that of the original thirteen states that rati33
fied the Constitution. It was an interpretation of the Union shared
by President Abraham Lincoln, who said of the secessionists, “In their
view, the Union, as a family relation, would not be anything like a
regular marriage at all, but only as a sort of free love arrangement to
34
be maintained on what that sect calls passionate attraction.” Modern scholars concur, and the consensus is that no constitutional basis
35
for a legal secession exists.
In viewing Governor Perry’s statements in this light, one can reasonably describe his actions as advocating for an act against the laws
of the United States. But Governor Perry’s words were mild and weak
nearly triple the per capita federal tax burden in effect in 2007. This fiscal reality
makes it impracticable to secede and still maintain anywhere near the current level
of government services and programming and moreover defeats the purpose of seceding to avoid what are perceived to be onerous federal income taxes.
30
See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700 (1869), overruled in part by Morgan v. United
States, 113 U.S. 476, 496 (1885).
31
Id. at 724–26 (“The position . . . that the legislature of Texas, while the State
was owner of the bonds, could limit their negotiability by an act of legislation, of
which all subsequent purchasers were charged with notice although the bonds on
their face were payable to bearer, must be regarded as overruled.”).
32
Id. at 724–25.
33
Id. at 726.
34
WILLIAM LEE MILLER, LINCOLN’S VIRTUES: AN ETHICAL BIOGRAPHY 451 (2002).
35
See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 242 (2006).
Citing Article III of the U.S. Constitution, Amar asserts, “In the event a state made
war on the United States, those who fought for the state would be, in a scarlet word,
traitors: ‘Treason against the United States, shall consist . . . in levying War against
them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them aid and comfort.’” Id. Amar also
points to a rejected provision proposed by Anti-Federalist Martin Luther at the Constitutional Convention which would have excluded from the Article III definition of
“Treason” any citizen who acted against the United States in a “Civil War” between a
state and the “General” government. Id. Despite Luther’s warnings that “the treason
clause as finally worded made no exception for unilateral state secession or civil war,”
the American people ratified the Constitution with the treason clause intact. Id.

CAMONI_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

6/16/2011 2:51 PM

COMMENT

1011

when compared to some other secessionists in Texas. In August
2009, a group calling itself the “Texas Nationalist Movement” held a
rally in Austin to deliver a petition demanding “Sovereignty or Seces36
sion.” Asserting that the Declaration of Independence gives them
the right to “alter or abolish” the government if, “after a long train of
abuses” it has failed to protect the people’s rights, the “Movement”
37
invited Governor Perry to join them in Austin, but he declined. The
event’s organizers claim to have gathered over one million signatures
on the petition, a number called into question by the group’s reticence in actually making the petition public as well as the meager
38
turnout of less than 200 for the August 2009 gathering. The speakers were not deterred by the lack of public interest, however, railing
to the secessionist faithful with fervor.
A. Daniel Miller
The leader of the Texas Nationalist Movement (“TNM”) is Daniel Miller, the former president of the Republic of Texas (“RoT”),
which is a group that believes Texas was never legally annexed and,
therefore, has always been an independent nation. According to the
Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, RoT teaches its
members a complex set of bank fraud, document fraud, and “paper
terrorism” techniques, which RoT justifies through “elaborate conspiracy theories” and the belief that the United States has no legal au-

36

See Ian Millhiser, Texas ‘Tenthers’ Plan Pro-Secession Rally Tomorrow, THINK
PROGRESS (Aug. 28, 2009, 8:30 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/2009/08/28/texastenthers-rally/. The petition demands “the abolishment of all legislation which infringes in the least upon the rights of the people.” Sovereignty or Secession Declaration
and Petition, WE THE PEOPLE, http://www.drawaline.org/Sovereignty_or_
Secession_Petition.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2011). It is difficult to conceive of any
law that does not in some way limit the absolute liberty of someone. The petition also demands “that the United States of America should restore the Republic of Texas
to its original boundaries of 1844.” Id. For that demand to be met, the new Republic
of Texas would have to annex parts of present-day Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, and Wyoming. See Map of Texas and Countries Adjacent, 1844, DAVID
RUMSEY MAP COLLECTION http://www.davidrumsey.com/maps2548.html (last visited
April 18, 2011).
37
Forrest Wilder, “We Hate the United States”: Secessionists Rally at Capitol While Perry
Stays Home, TEXAS OBSERVER (Aug. 29, 2009), available at http://www.alternet.org/
news/142340/%22we_hate_the_united_states%22:_secessionists_rally_at_tx_capitol_
/?page=1. The Declaration of Independence, of course, has no legal authority. See,
e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Declaration of Independence, however, is not a legal prescription conferring powers upon
the courts.”).
38
See Wilder, supra note 37.
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thority over an independent Texas. In 1997, an RoT leader kidnapped two people, declared them “prisoners of war” for twelve
hours, sought a prisoner exchange for the release of two RoT mem40
bers, and conducted a weeklong armed standoff with police. In
1998, two RoT members were convicted of plotting to assassinate various government officials, including President Bill Clinton, intending
to build “a cigarette lighter that would shoot cactus thorns dipped in
41
biological agents such as anthrax, rabies, botulism, and AIDS.” As
president of RoT, Miller advocated some cooperation with the U.S.
government, saying that “[t]he American people are our broth42
ers. . . . We extend a helping hand.” The cooperation Miller offered
was to organize border patrols to “collect and forcibly deport Mexican immigrants illegally crossing the border,” in direct contravention
43
of INS instructions.
Now president of TNM, Miller addressed the small crowd at the
Austin rally, calling on the state legislature to choose either “sovereignty or secession,” and stating that, “if [the state legislators] do not
44
pick up that banner and carry it high, then we will.” To illustrate his
point, Miller leapt into the crowd to hoist a flag with the image of an
M-16 assault rifle under the slogan “Come and Take It,” one of the
45
“Tea Party” fringe’s favorite symbols. The blazon of “Come and
Take It” over an image of a cannon adorned the battle flag that the
46
actual Republic of Texas flew in the war against Santa Anna’s army.
The modern update is one of many items sold online as part of the
47
secessionist movement.

39
Terrorism Knowledge Base, MEMORIAL INST. FOR THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM,
http://web.archive.org/web/20070930033315/http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?grou
pID=95 (last visited Mar. 31, 2011). MIPT is a non-profit organization dedicated to
preventing terrorism on U.S. soil or mitigating its effects. MIPT is funded by the
Dept. of Homeland Security.
40
Id.
41
Id. It should be noted that, among other flaws in this plot, AIDS is a syndrome,
and not a tangible substance into which cactus needles could be dipped.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Wilder, supra note 37.
45
See id.
46
See Texas Gonzales Flag, TEXAS FLAG MAN, http://www.texasflagman.com/
catalog/product_info.php?cPath=2&products_id=65 (last visited Mar. 31, 2011).
47
See, e.g., TEXAS FLAG MAN, http://www.texasflagman.com/catalog/. The products at this site are sold by the group “TexasSecede.org,” whose website links through
to Miller’s TNM website. Among the offerings of the “Flag Man” are the Texas State
Flag, the Alamo Flag from 1824, the Gadsen “Don’t Tread on Me!” Flag, and the
Confederate Battle Flag. The “Flag Man” does not carry the American Flag.
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Another point of historical affection for Miller and many secessionists is the Confederacy. Miller painted a nostalgic image of the
Civil War at the Austin rally, indicating the statute of Lady Liberty
atop the Capitol. “‘When they raised her to the top of this Capitol
they wanted to face her south so she would forever have her back
turned to that nation to the north that knew not liberty,’ he told the
48
almost entirely white crowd.” The TNM website refers to the Civil
War as the legally-unjustified slaughter of 630,000 Americans perpetrated by a “mythical humanitarian,” Abraham Lincoln, and is critical
49
of the Emancipation Proclamation. Another telling signal of the secessionists’ racial politics appeared on many of their signs at the protests in Austin: the image of President Barack Obama with his face
50
digitally altered to appear as the Joker from Batman. This image
became a favorite of the secessionists, tea-party groups, and other extreme right-wing factions in the summer of 2009. In looking at the
image, one is immediately struck by the notion that it took the first
black President and put him in white face; and in clown makeup to
boot.
Miller expands on his views at much greater length on the TNM
website, where he writes blog entries, recruits members, collects do51
nations, and announces upcoming events. Miller circulates a peti52
tion demanding a popular referendum on secession. Several of the
posts refer to a potential military response to a decision by Texas to
secede. One Miller post cites a poll stating that “42% of members of
the armed forces . . . agree secession is a right,” and states that this
number “raises some interesting questions about what would happen
to a U.S. soldier from Texas in the unlikely creation of a Lone Star
53
Republic.” Miller argues that the polling “speaks to the question
that we often get regarding a military response from the Federal Gov-

48

Wilder, supra note 37.
Lauren Savage, ‘Yes’ If Texas Could Secede, TEXAS NATIONALIST MOVEMENT (Nov.
1,
2009),
http://www.texasnationalist.com/index.php?option=com_myblog
&Itemid=105.
50
See Wilder, supra note 37.
51
See TEXAS NATIONALIST MOVEMENT, http://www.texasnationalist.com/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2011).
52
See
Let
Texas
Decide
Petition,
TEXAS
NATIONALIST
MOVEMENT,
http://www.texasnationalist.com/forms/let-texas-decide-petition-10.pdf (last visited
Mar. 31, 2011).
53
Daniel Miller, Military Support for Independence, TEXAS NATIONALIST MOVEMENT
(Sep. 20, 2009) http://www.texasnationalist.com/index.php?option=com_content
&view=article&id=196:military-support-for-independence&catid=8:newsflash&
Itemid=104.
49
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ernment when Texas secedes.” Seemingly, Miller is suggesting that
42% of U.S. troops would likely fight against the U.S. military if a
55
forcible response were invoked against Texas secession.
B. Debra Medina
The TNM website also endorsed the gubernatorial candidacy of
56
another speaker at the August rally, Debra Medina. Medina is a
“Ron Paul Republican” and was a candidate to replace Perry as Gov57
ernor in 2010. The Texas Nationalist Movement supports Medina’s
candidacy because she is pro-secession and supports the invocation of
58
“nullification.” As TNM sees it, nullification is a simple enforcement
of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, thereby allowing states to rescind or ignore any federal law that is not explicitly authorized in the
59
Constitution. At TNM’s rally in Austin, Medina shared her outlook
on secession with the crowd: “We are aware that stepping off into secession may in fact be a bloody war. We are aware that the tree of
freedom is occasionally watered with the blood of tyrants and pa60
triots.” This last line alludes to a Thomas Jefferson quote with an infamous history of being taken out of context and used by the anti61
government right wing. Probably the most notorious use occurred
when Timothy McVeigh wore the words on a t-shirt as he bombed the
62
Oklahoma City Federal Building in 1995.
54

Id.
See Part II.C infra and accompanying text regarding Larry Kilgore and Texas
appropriation of federal military resources.
56
See Darryl Mulloy, Steps to Texas Independence, TEXAS NATIONALIST MOVEMENT,
http://www.texasnationalist.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=
204&catid=10:president-blog (last visited Feb. 11, 2010).
57
Wilder, supra note 37.
58
Mulloy, supra note 56.
59
See id.
60
Wilder, supra note 37.
61
See, e.g., Sean Hannity, Obama Plucking the Tree of Liberty Bare, FOX NEWS (May 6,
2009) http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,519158,00.html.
62
‘Turner Diaries’ Introduced in McVeigh Trial, CNN (Apr. 28, 1997),
http://www.cnn.com/US/9704/28/okc/. The irony of Medina and other proponents of secession and state sovereignty using this Thomas Jefferson quote, a reaction
to Shay’s Rebellion in Massachusetts, is readily seen when the quote is presented in
context:
The people cannot be all, and always, well informed. The part which is
wrong will be discontented, in proportion to the importance of the
facts they misconceive. If they remain quiet under such misconceptions, it is lethargy, the forerunner of death to the public liberty. . . .
And what country can preserve its liberties, if its rulers are not warned
from time to time, that this people preserve the spirit of resistance?
55
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C. Larry Kilgore
63

Larry Kilgore hates the United States. An oft-rejected, though
never deterred, candidate for Governor of Texas, Kilgore hates pretty
much everything about the U.S. government. “We hate the United
States!” he shouted when it was his turn to address the small crowd at
64
the Texas capitol. “‘I hate that flag up there,’ Kilgore said pointing
to the American flag flying over the Capitol. ‘I hate the United States
65
government. . . . They’re an evil, corrupt government.’” Kilgore
exhorted the crowd to turn this hatred into action: “They need to go.
66
Sovereignty is not good enough. Secession is what we need!” Larry
Kilgore wants Texas to leave the United States, and he wants anyone
who disagrees with him to leave Texas. After the rally, “Kilgore was
seen yelling at some health-care reform advocates to ‘Go back to the
67
U.S. where you belong.’”
Kilgore’s online outlets repeatedly advocate for secession and
other illegal acts. His Facebook message for Veteran’s Day 2009 read,
“Thank you Veterans. If a military coup becomes necessary to protect
68
us from domestic enemies, do your duty.” He is a proponent of the

Let them take arms. The remedy is to set them right as to the facts,
pardon and pacify them. What signify a few lives lost in a century or
two? The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time, with the
blood of patriots and tyrants. It is its natural manure.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William S. Smith (Nov. 13, 1787), available at
http://etext.virginia.edu/etcbin/ot2www-singleauthor?specfile=/web/data/jefferson
/texts/jefall.o2w&act=text&offset=5674387&textreg=1&query=tree+of+liberty.
Jefferson saw the unrest in Massachusetts as a sign of ignorance and misconception, and the remedy was for the “rulers” to set the malcontents right as to the facts.
See id. “For Jefferson, this was a textbook example of how passions could cloud
judgment, creating an atmosphere of panic and fear.” Brad Hart, Jefferson’s “Tree of
Liberty” Quote in Context, AMERICAN CREATION (Aug. 18, 2009, 6:58 PM),
http://americancreation.blogspot.com/2009/08/jeffersons-tree-of-liberty-quotein.html.
While it is true that Jefferson was wont to hyperbolize regarding the glorification
of revolution, in this case he was saying only that the passionate overreactions of the
masses should serve to remind the federal government that the liberty to dissent
must be preserved. See JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX 99–103 (1996).
63
See generally FAQ’S, http://www.larrykilgore.com/Larry_Kilgore/FAQs.html
(last visited Sep. 21, 2009).
64
Wilder, supra note 37.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Larry Kilgore for Gov—Texas Secession, FACEBOOK PAGES, FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/pages/Larry-Kilgore-for-Gov-Texas-Secession/
44066004175 (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
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death penalty for homosexuals. He has posted links to videos of an
interview on an Iranian state television network, wherein Daniel Miller and Thomas Naylor, a Vermont secessionist, describe what “free70
dom from American tyranny will be like.” It is unknown how many
readers Kilgore’s websites have attracted, but Kilgore did garner
71
226,000 votes for Texas Senator in the 2008 Republican primary.
D. Clay Laird
Clay Laird did not speak at the August rally, but he did make an
appearance in the capitol on April 15, 2009, for a hearing before
72
Texas’s Senate Transportation and Homeland Security Committee.
Laird was escorted from the committee chambers when he threatened to visit the homes of Senators who opposed an anti-”sanctuary
73
city” measure. He told legislators that if they did not support the
74
bill, they would “hear from him.” When asked where they could ex75
pect to hear from Laird, he responded, “At your homes.”
“[W]herever you live. . . . I mean I’m gonna be knocking on your
76
door.” When Committee Chair John Carona cautioned Laird that
his comment sounded like a threat, Laird assured Carona, “It’s not a
threat, sir, it’s a promise written in blood. It might be yours, it might
77
be mine.”

69

See Matt Lum, Protesters Ultimately Want Death for Homosexuals, TEX. TRIANGLE,
Mar.
2–8,
2001,
available
at
http://www.glapn.org/sodomylaws/usa/
texas/txnews64.htm (“Well, we know punishing homosexuals by death would be extremely hard in today’s society. . . . But we hope that we can help to drive it underground so in about twenty or thirty years, the punishment can fit the crime.”).
70
Larry Kilgore, http://www.facebook.com/pages/Larry-Kilgore-for-Gov-TexasSecession/44066004175 (Oct. 14, 2009); The videos are available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yIu5fk8Bejc
and
http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=pMa12OU903k.
71
See Karl-Thomas Musselman, Larry Kilgore Withdraws from Governor’s Race, Endorses Debra Medina, BURNT ORANGE REPORT (Dec. 15, 2009, 3:53 PM),
http://www.burntorangereport.com/diary/9757/larry-kilgore-withdraws-fromgovernors-race-endorses-debra-medina.
72
See Richard Whittaker, Menacing Behavior Under the Dome, NEWSDESK, AUSTIN
CHRONICLE
(Apr.
15,
2009,
3:06
PM),
available
at
http://www.austinchronicle.com/blogs/news/2009-04-15/767665/.
73
See id.
74
Ben Wear, Witness Escorted by DPS from Senate Hearing, POSTCARDS,
STATESMAN.COM
(Apr. 15, 2009, 9:33 AM), http://www.statesman.com/
blogs/content/shared-gen/blogs/austin/politics/entries/2009/04/15/witness_
escorted_by_dps_from_s.html.
75
Id.
76
Whittaker, supra note 72.
77
Id.
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Laird is a secession advocate in Texas and a frequent reader and
poster on secession blogs and websites. On a Facebook page opposing federal gun control, Laird advocated for teaching children as
young as six how to shoot, and followed with this appeal: “If you are a
TRUE conserative [sic], move to Texas. We will need your help in the
78
comming [sic] years.” Why Texas may need armed conservatives
might have something to do with Laird’s post on the TexasSecede.com blog. In response to a blog entry about the legality of secession, Laird commented, “One simple question for those that say
we can’t secede: If some of us are willing to die to get Texas out of the
USSA [sic], how many in the old 48 (am not including Alaska, my
79
second home) are willing to die to keep us?” Three days after that
post, Laird expanded on the same comment on another website, saying that
If you want your children to live in a free Capitalist [country],
then come/stay and join us. Those of you that want someone to
take care of you, please leave before we drive you out. You only
have a few years to make a decision. After that the fence on the
80
South, West, North, East will be built to keep all [socialists] out.

He also stated, “Every real Texan knows they are required to have
81
weapons and ammunition.” Laird further suggested that Texas con82
tains and runs most of the military bases in the U.S. and that when
soldiers return from overseas, presumably referring to Iraq and Afg83
hanistan, they would assist in the secession effort.
Just a few weeks later, Laird threatened the Texas Senate committee members. Then a few days after that Laird posted a comment
on another blog page identifying himself as the man who was es-

78

Clay Laird (Oct. 10, 2009, 11:43 PM), Comment to Wall, Fight to Protect the 2nd
Amendment
from
H.R.
45,
FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/group.
php?gid=56069929010#/group.php?v=wall&gid=56069929010.
79
Clay Laird (May 26, 2009, 9:18 AM), Comment to Mindless Obedience, Anyone?,
TEXAS SECEDE! (May 25, 2009, 7:31 PM), http://texassecede.blogspot.com/
2009/03/mindless-obedience-anyone.html.
80
Clay Laird (May 29, 2009, 12:17 PM), Comment to Tony Romm, So What if Texas Did Secede from the Union, BRIGHT HALL (Apr. 23, 2009, 7:26 PM),
http://brighthall.aol.com/2009/04/23/so-what-if-texas-did-secede-from-theunion/7.
81
Id.
82
Texas is home to 28 of the 440 U.S. military bases located within the continental United States. See Military Bases in the Continental US, NAT’L PARK SERV., U.S. DEP’T
INTERIOR,
http://www.nps.gov/history/nagpra/DOCUMENTS/
OF
THE
BasesMilitaryMAp.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2011).
83
See Laird, supra note 80; see also supra note 9 and accompanying text regarding
the DHS report’s concerns about recruitment of returning veterans.
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corted out of the Senate hearing the previous week. He went on to
say that he was planning to return to the capitol the following day to
once again “comment” on a House Resolution, and gave the time,
85
building address, and room number. His conclusion was chilling:
“If you don’t hear from me after tomorrow, please check the Travis
86
county jail. Clay Laird, CDT (Certified Domestic Terrorist).”
III. FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE REGARDING SUBVERSIVE SPEECH:
THE BRANDENBURG DOCTRINE
Many of the extreme examples of inciteful speech in the above
case study may substantially contribute to the possibilities of violence
87
that the DHS report warned of. Regulating such speech would aid
in achieving the legitimate state interest of preventing violence, but
the interaction of the First Amendment and the Internet renders this
kind of regulation a difficult proposition.
A. The Current State of the Law
First Amendment doctrine, and in particular, the famous line of
Supreme Court decisions addressing the restrictions placed on subversive speech, has been explored and explained thoroughly in legal
88
scholarship. For the purposes of this Comment, two judicial tests
that formed the foundation for the Brandenburg doctrine are particularly relevant.
The first is Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s “clear and present
89
danger” test. In Schenck v. United States, Justice Holmes wrote that
the government could place restraints on speech if the “words are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about substantive evils
90
that Congress has a right to prevent.” “Falsely shouting fire in a
theater and causing a panic” would not be protected speech accord-

84
See Clay Laird (Apr. 20, 2009, 12:33 PM), Comment to No More Government Bailouts!, TEXASFRED BLOG (Apr. 17, 2009), http://texasfred.net/archives/4026.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
See supra note 4.
88
See, e.g., ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT WE HATE (2007); Thomas
Healy, Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655 (2009); Chris
Montgomery, Can Brandenburg v. Ohio Survive the Internet and the Age of Terrorism?,
70 OHIO ST. L.J. 141 (2009); David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1207 (1983).
89
See Schneck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
90
Id. at 52.
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ing to Justice Holmes. Justice Holmes refined the test in his dissent
from Abrams v. United States, emphasizing the requirement that a dan92
ger be imminent to allow restriction of speech. The United States
could “punish speech that produces and is intended to produce a
clear and imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith certain
93
substantive evils.” Justice Holmes crafted this statement of the test
in a dissent in which he would have overturned the conviction of the
defendant for an act Holmes described as “the surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man” because it presented no
94
immediate danger.
In his powerful dissent, Justice Holmes called for greater protec95
tions for speech than he had in the past. He said the “ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas,” and “that the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
96
competition of the market.” Of our Constitution, he said, “It is an
experiment, as all life is an experiment,” so we should “be eternally
vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we
97
loathe and believe to be fraught with death.” Such checks should
only be imposed where an imminent danger poses a threat to the law,
98
and therefore the nation, itself. As one author aptly put it, “Holmes
99
was the closest we have had to a poet judge.”
Eight years later in Whitney v. California, Justice Holmes joined
another eloquent opinion urging strong protection of the freedom of
100
speech.
Justice Louis Brandeis penned a concurrence “that many
regard as the greatest judicial statement of the case for freedom of
101
speech.” Brandeis argued that
those who won our independence . . . believed that freedom to
think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free
speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them,
discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dis-

91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101

Id.
250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 627.
Id. at 628.
See LEWIS, supra note 88, at 23–38 .
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id.
See id. at 630–31.
LEWIS, supra note 88, at 33.
274 U.S. 357 (1927).
LEWIS, supra note 88, at 35.
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semination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty;
and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American
government. . . . Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and
burnt women. . . . To justify suppression of free speech there
must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if
free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be
reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a se102
rious one.

Two years later, evoking his own notion of protecting “expressions of opinions we loathe” expressed in Abrams, Justice Holmes dis103
sented in United States v. Schwimmer. Justice Holmes disagreed with
the defendant’s pacifist views, he wrote, but he defended her right to
104
express those views. “[I]f there is any principle of the Constitution
that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the
principle of free thought—not free thought for those who agree with
105
us but freedom for the thought that we hate.”
Justices Holmes and Brandeis both advocated for strict protections of speech that should be overcome only where the speech
creates a clear and imminent danger of some grave harm to our law
and nation. That it might have been important to Holmes’s position
in Abrams that the leaflet was published by an “unknown man” foreshadowed the contribution of Judge Learned Hand to this area of
First Amendment jurisprudence. In Dennis v. United States, Judge
Hand endorsed “clear and present danger” as a valid “shorthand
statement” of the general type of speech that the First Amendment
does not protect, but found that the term did not in itself fully define
106
107
the analysis. In a variation on the famous Hand Calculus, Judge
Hand devised a formula for judges to use in determining whether the
repression of a particular utterance would be justified. “In each case
they must ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to

102

Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375–78 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
279 U.S. 644 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
104
See id. at 654.
105
Id. at 654–55.
106
183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950).
107
See United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (In the
context of tort liability, “if the probability [of injury] be called P; the [gravity of the]
injury, L; and the burden [of adequate precautions], B; liability depends upon
whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B less than PL.”)
103
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avoid the danger.”
Chief Justice Fred Vinson adopted this sliding
scale approach to “clear and present danger” when the Supreme
109
Court affirmed Judge Hand’s decision.
The Chief Justice asserted
that “[o]bviously, the words cannot mean that before the Government may act, it must wait until the putsch is about to be executed, the
110
plans have been laid and the signal is awaited.” The result of Judge
Hand’s new approach was “a significant watering down of the doctrine as interpreted by Justices Holmes and Brandeis—gone were the
requirements of imminence and intent—and it placed near-absolute
111
importance on the perceived threat . . . by the judge and jury.”
Under Judge Hand’s formula, even the minutest likelihood of the intended evil ever actually coming about could be enough to justify re112
straint on speech if the gravity of the harm was weighty enough.
The Supreme Court articulated the current constitutional standard applicable to speech advocating for the commission of unlawful
113
acts in Brandenburg v. Ohio in 1969. In implementing a very protective reading of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court held that
the “constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or
of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
114
such action.”
Under Brandenburg, subversive speech is protected
from governmental restraint unless it is both (1) intentionally directed at inciting immediate and unlawful action, and (2) likely to ac115
tually produce such action.
The Brandenburg Doctrine combined the imminence requirement from Justices Holmes and Brandeis with the element of likelihood from Judge Hand and Justice Vinson. In general, it reinforced
the notion that the “the mere abstract teaching . . . of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not
the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to
116
such action.” The Court went on to state that a “statute which fails
to draw this distinction impermissibly intrudes upon the freedoms
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116

Dennis, 183 F.2d at 212.
See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951).
Id.
Montgomery, supra note 88, at 152.
See id.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
Id. at 447.
Id. at 447–48.
Id. at 448.
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guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. It sweeps within its condemnation speech which our Constitution has immunized
117
from governmental control.”
Conversely, a statute that does carefully draw the distinction between advocating for the use of force or
violence in the abstract and speech intended to incite some person or
persons to immediately use force or violence does not intrude upon
118
the freedom of speech.
One further court decision since Brandenburg is worth noting
here. In Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., the Fourth Circuit examined
the First Amendment claim of the publisher of a book called Hit
119
Man: A Technical Manual for Independent Contractors.
The case
against the publisher was a wrongful death suit brought by survivors
of murder victims whose killers applied the very specific and very
120
graphic techniques taught in the book.
The publisher stipulated
that the book was published with the full knowledge and intent that
the information it contained would be used by readers to commit
121
murders-for-hire.
The Court, stating that this type of speech was
not the “mere advocacy” of an unlawful act, held that the government
does not need to satisfy the imminency requirement to proscribe
122
speech under those circumstances.
In reaching this holding, the court found that “Brandenburg’s
imminency requirement . . . did not apply because it is only pertinent
‘where, as in Brandenburg itself, the government attempts to restrict
123
advocacy, as such.’”
The court also found that freedom of speech
“would not relieve from liability those who would . . . intentionally assist and encourage crime and then shamelessly seek refuge in the
124
sanctuary of the First Amendment.” The court stated that “just because a message may be disseminated to a wide audience does not au125
tomatically provide First Amendment protection.”
Ultimately, the
court found that the book constituted speech that was “the antithesis
126
of speech protected under Brandenburg.”
117

Id.
See id.
119
128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
120
See id. at 239.
121
See id. at 241.
122
Id. at 249.
123
Nadine E. McSpadden, Note, Slow and Steady Does Not Always Win the Race, 76
IND. L.J. 485, 495 (2001) (quoting Rice, 128 F.3d at 246)
124
Rice, 128 F.3d at 248.
125
McSpadden, supra note 123, at 495.
126
Rice, 128 F.3d at 249.
118
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If speech urges violence with the intent to provoke the reader to
act, then under the reasoning of Rice, the imminence requirement
127
would not apply because the speech is not “advocacy as such.” This
allows for regulation of inciteful speech even without imminence in
the context of a book, as in Rice, or on the Internet.
B. The Difficulty of Applying Brandenburg to the Internet
Commentators have identified the imminency requirement of
Brandenburg as creating a major impediment to policing truly dangerous speech on the Internet. “A website will never be able to fulfill
128
the imminency requirement.” The crux of the problem lies in the
nature of communication on the Internet. With the exception of
web tools such as chatting or video conferencing, which are more
akin to telephonic communication, most communication via the Internet rarely occurs in the contemporaneous manner contemplated
by the Brandenburg Doctrine. Most commonly, a poster creates a page
and publishes it to the web, but because Internet users must log on
and find content, “it could be a day, a week, or a year before a user
129
accesses the Web page.”
Therefore, while any instantaneous communication, such as instant messages or video chats, can satisfy the
imminence requirement, a traditional webpage is not instantaneous—it is speech that is set down to wait for an audience—and as
such, it presents a circumstance in which a court cannot find imminence.
Likewise, the imminence requirement recognizes that, if there is
enough time between the speech and the unlawful act it intends to
incite, intervening speech from other sources may dissuade the audience from committing that act, and the original speech is therefore
not dangerous enough to outweigh the protections of the First
130
Amendment. The Internet’s design, however, is perfectly suited to
allowing users to see, read, and hear only what they seek out, thus
diminishing the possibility that any other viewpoints will be heard be131
fore a user takes action.
In such circumstances, the lack of immi-

127

Id. at 246.
McSpadden, supra note 123, at 497; see also Kenneth J. Brown, Assessing The Legitimacy Of Governmental Regulation Of Modern Speech Aimed At Social Reform: The Importance Of Hindsight And Causation, 10 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 459, 476 (“Analysis
that courts have traditionally used for other broadcast media simply does not apply
to the Internet.”).
129
McSpadden, supra note 123, at 497.
130
See id. at 498.
131
Id.
128
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nence does not seem to affect the level of danger that a viewer of inciteful messages will act upon them.
Brandenburg simply does not contemplate the Internet context.
Some recommend “expanding the relatively strict temporal require132
ments of the doctrine’s imminence requirement.” Regarding websites advocating for terroristic attacks on the United States, one
commentator argues that in the current climate, indeed in all times
of threat, there exists a “threshold of imminence” because of the circumstances, and thus all inciteful speech posted on the Internet
133
should be considered to pose an “imminent” danger.
One commentator suggests that courts should consider imminence from the
134
point of view of the reader rather than the poster. Under this reading of the imminence test, “a court would inquire into whether the
viewer, upon reading the message, is likely to be incited to initiate
135
imminent, lawless action.”
All of these scholars stress the importance of maintaining the protective intent of Brandenburg to avoid a
chilling effect on legitimate speech while curbing the dangers of inciteful speech intended to provoke unlawful action. Rice differentiated between legitimate speech and speech that did not invoke protections under Brandenburg, and would leave the imminency
requirement intact only as a protection of the former.
If the Rice approach is ignored and Brandenburg is strictly applied
in all circumstances, dangerous speech on the Internet cannot be regulated without violating the First Amendment. But a statutory solution that applies the reasoning from Rice to avoid burdening First
Amendment rights could remedy this difficulty. Such regulation is
not without precedent. There exists another mode of communication that is not contemporaneous, but over which Congress has regulatory power, and from which insurrectionist speech materials may be
excluded: the Postal Service.

132

Montgomery, supra note 88, at 163.
Thomas E. Crocco, Comment, Inciting Terrorism on the Internet: An Application of
Brandenburg to Terrorist Websites, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 451, 459 (2004).
134
See John P. Cronan, The Next Challenge for the First Amendment: The Framework for
an Internet Incitement Standard, 51 CATH. U.L. REV. 425, 456 (2002).
135
Id.
133
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IV. APPLYING THE NONMAILABILITY PROVISION OF THE
ESPIONAGE ACT TO THE INTERNET
A. Section 1717
In the United States, mailing any material advocating or urging
treason, insurrection, or forcible resistance to any law of the United
136
These kinds of materials were declared
States is a federal crime.
nonmailable by the predecessor to 18 U.S.C. § 1717, originally passed
137
as part of the Espionage Act of 1917. In the run-up to World War I,
the Department of Justice was concerned that traditional treason laws
would not suffice in combating “political agitation . . . of a certain
138
character directly affecting the safety of the state.” The debates surrounding the adoption of the Act reveal much about Congress’s concern with balancing First Amendment freedom of speech against the
very real danger that some kinds of speech might pose under the cir139
cumstances.
Regulation of the mail is subject to First Amendment analysis in
140
the courts, though this was not always the case. The Supreme Court
had originally adopted the “Privilege Doctrine” in dealing with claims
that a postal regulation unconstitutionally restricted First Amendment rights. Beginning in Ex Parte Jackson, the Court held that “[t]he
power possessed by Congress embraces the regulation of the entire
postal system of the country. The right to designate what shall be
carried necessarily involves the right to determine what shall be ex141
cluded.” The Privilege Doctrine came under a slow-grinding attack,
and is no longer considered good law. Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, writing in a 1921 dissent, said, “The United States may give
up the Post office when it sees fit; but while it carries it on the use of
the mails is almost as much a part of free speech as the right to use
142
our tongues . . . .”
In 1957, Justice John Marshall Harlan, concurring in part and dissenting in part in Roth v. United States, remarked
that “[t]he hoary dogma of [Jackson], that the use of the mails is a
136

See 18 U.S.C. § 1717 (2006).
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 343–346 (1917).
138
Rabban, supra note 88, at 1217.
139
See id.
140
See generally United States v. Handler, 383 F. Supp. 1267, 1275–76 (D. Md.
1974) (tracing the history of the Privilege Doctrine and adopting the modern rule
from Hiett v. United States, 415 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1976), and Tollett v. United
States, 485 F.2d 1087 (8th Cir. 1973)).
141
Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732 (1877).
142
United States ex rel. Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Publ’g Co. v. Burleson, 255
U.S. 407, 437 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
137
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privilege on which the Government may impose such conditions as it
143
chooses, has long since evaporated.” Then in 1965, Justice William
O. Douglas quoted Justice Holmes’s dissent in Burleson in the majority
144
opinion in Lamont v. Postmaster General, and brought the use of the
mail to disseminate one’s opinions under the protection of the First
145
Amendment.
Therefore, the modern holding is that prohibitions
contained in postal regulatory statutes “must be construed in the
light of the First Amendment rather than in the light of any regulato146
ry power granted to the Postal Service.”
Even before the modern First Amendment analysis of mail regulation, Congress was concerned with restrictions on free speech imposed by restrictions on what could be mailed. The modern §
1717(a) bars “every letter writing, circular, postal card, picture, print,
engraving, photograph, newspaper, pamphlet, book, or other publication, matter or thing” that violates several enumerated sections or
“which contains any matter advocating or urging treason, insurrection, or forcible resistance to any law of the United States” from the
147
mails. Such material is deemed entirely “nonmailable,” and the sta148
tute prohibits carriers and post offices from conveying it.
Subsection (b) of § 1717 makes it a crime to use or “attempt to use the mails
or Postal Service for the transmission of any matter declared by this
section to be nonmailable,” and prescribes as punishment fines or up
149
to ten years imprisonment, or both.
The Postal Service is given discretion as to the handling of nonmailable materials under 39 U.S.C. § 3001. Any materials barred
from the mail by § 1717, but which nonetheless reach the office of
150
delivery, “shall be disposed of as the Postal Service shall direct.”
This includes the power to destroy illegally mailed items, a power
151
which has been upheld despite a First Amendment challenge.
The nonmailability provision of the Espionage Act was intended
as a restriction on a particular mode of dissemination of certain types
of speech, but was not enacted without great consideration of the
143

354 U.S. 476, 505 n.5 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in

part).
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151

See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 305 (1965).
Id.
Tollett, 485 F.2d at 1091.
18 U.S.C. § 1717 (2006).
Id.
Id.
39 U.S.C. § 3001(b) (2006).
See Cherry v. Postmaster General, 272 F. Supp. 982 (D.P.R. 1967).
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152

First Amendment. This provision was approved, while a censorship
153
provision in the same bill was struck in conference committee. The
censorship portion of the bill would have allowed the President to
154
censor the press, which brought much criticism from Congress.
The major distinction between the two—that which doomed the censorship provision while the nonmailability provision survived—was
155
the issue of prior restraint.
The censorship provision would have
restricted speech by prohibiting publication (i.e., it would have constituted a “prior restraint”), whereas the nonmailability provision
placed no restriction on publication, though it “could effectively pre156
vent circulation.”
This distinction is important, because the Supreme Court has held that “prior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and least tolerable infringement on First
157
Amendment Rights.”
The Court has also held, however, that enjoining publication of material that is not “arguably protected
speech,” is not an impermissible prior restraint where the regulation
158
“is clear and sweeps no more broadly than necessary.”
Congress also voiced concern about possible abuse in the interpretation of the definition of “treason.” One representative cautioned, “A whole lot of people here and elsewhere seem to think that
if a man does not agree with you he is a traitor and guilty of treason159
able utterances.”
As Professor David Rabban points out, however,
“even vociferous opponents of the nonmailability provision conceded
throughout the lengthy congressional debates that a variety of publi160
cations should not be circulated.”
The nonmailability provision was not without precedent at the
time of its adoption. The Comstock Act, as amended in 1876, prohibited the transmission of “every obscene, lewd, or lascivious book,
pamphlet, picture, paper, writing, print, or other publication of an
161
indecent character” through the mail.
Therefore, the Post Office

152

See Rabban, supra 88, at 1219–23.
See id. at 1218.
154
Id. at 1218–1219.
155
See id. at 1219.
156
Id. at 1221.
157
Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
158
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Rights, 413 U.S. 376,
390 (1973).
159
Rabban, supra note 88, at 1220.
160
Id.
161
Susan W. Brenner, Complicit Publication: When Should the Dissemination of Ideas
and Data Be Criminalized?, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 273, 311 (2003); see also 17 Stat.
153
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was already empowered to exclude certain matter from the mail, a
162
power tested and upheld by the Supreme Court. Viewed as an expansion of sorts of the Comstock restrictions, the nonmailability provision seemed far less onerous than the wholly new restriction on
163
speech contained in the censorship provision.
The constitutionality of the nonmailability provision was upheld
164
In Masses, a magazine
in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten in 1917.
called “The Masses,” a self-styled revolutionary publication advocating
radical, passive resistance to United States’ laws, was deemed unmail165
able by the Postmaster. The magazine’s publisher argued that the
statute stifled freedom of the press in violation of the First Amend166
ment.
At the district court level, Judge Learned Hand had construed the Espionage Act as a whole quite narrowly, limiting its restrictions on speech to protect “anything less than urging resistance
167
to the law.” The Second Circuit reversed, holding that incitement
to a crime may be indirect. Addressing the nonmailability provision,
the court found that the statute clearly “imposes no restraint prior to
publication, and no restraint afterwards, except as it restricts circulation through the mails. Liberty of circulating may be essential to
freedom of the press, but liberty of circulating through the mails is
not, so long as its transportation in any other way as merchandise is
168
not forbidden.”
B. The Internet Is Like the Mail
The history of the Internet’s creation justifies regulating the Internet in a similar manner to the mail. The Postal Service is a federal
agency, intended to bring the country together through communica169
tion.
The Internet is essentially a quasi-public entity, having been
invented and funded solely by the federal government in its early
599 (1873). The Comstock Act is currently codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (2006), and
has not changed substantively in any way relevant to its import for this Comment.
162
Rabban, supra note 88, at 1222 (citing In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110, 133–35
(1892); Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736–37 (1877)).
163
Id.
164
246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
165
See id. at 34.
166
See id. at 27.
167
Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917); see Rabban, supra note
88, at 1238.
168
Masses, 246 F. at 27; see also Gitlow v. Kiely, 44 F.2d 227, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1930)
(holding that freedom of the press is not interfered with except by suppression before publication).
169
See infra notes 181–83 and accompanying text.
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years of existence.
The Internet exists now as an interwoven network of commercial and non-profit websites, which is actually the ful171
fillment of the original designers’ plans. Thus, the Internet is substantially similar to the Postal Service, and may be regulated in a
similar fashion. Additionally, by its very nature, the Internet is interstate commerce and falls fully within the power of Congress to regu172
late under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution.
The U.S. Postal Service is a “fundamental service” operated by
the federal government, “authorized by the Constitution, created by
173
Act of Congress, and supported by the people.” Congress intended
that the Postal Service would “bind the Nation together through the
personal, educational, literary, and business correspondence of the
174
people.”
The Postal Service is an agency of the U.S. government
and, specifically, an “independent establishment of the executive
175
The Internet is not currently operated by the governbranch.”
ment, but it was, and the motivation behind its creation was—similar
to that of the Postal Service—to establish a cohesive communication
176
system nationwide.
The Internet began as a system called ARPANET, created by the
U.S. Department of Defense’s Advanced Research Projects Agency
177
(ARPA). During the Cold War, there arose a desire within the military for a communication system that the U.S.S.R. could not knock
178
out with a single strike. For example, if a traditional telephone system is used, a caller is connected to the receiver through a single
179
point, a switchboard. If the switchboard is disabled, the caller is cut
180
off from the receiver. This is true of any linear communications sys181
tem where information is passed from point to point in a series.
The idea behind the Internet was to create a web of points, each
182
connected to multiple other points instead of a linear series. That
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182

See infra notes 185–200 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 185–200 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 201–02 and accompanying text.
39 U.S.C. § 101(a) (2006).
Id.
Id. § 201.
See infra notes 185–200 and accompanying text.
See JANET ABBATE, INVENTING THE INTERNET 2 (1999).
Id. at 9–11, 13–17.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 11–17, 30, 32.

CAMONI_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1030

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

6/16/2011 2:51 PM

[Vol. 41:1005

way, if any one point is removed from the system, the message can be
183
rerouted through other points.
“The system evolved through an unusual (and sometimes unea184
sy) alliance between military and civilian interests.”
The private
communications industry would never have originally attempted to
build the Internet because, for them, the risk outweighed the reward.
Professionals in the private sector thought the technical approach
taken by ARPA, a novel “packet switching” approach, was “crazy,” and
185
predicted its failure. So the Department of Defense (“DOD”) took
the initiative and granted contracts and funding to nonprofits and
universities to make it work, in addition to the work ARPA did in186
house. Work done by Rand (formerly RAND), a nonprofit corporation “dedicated to research on military strategy and technology” and
funded primarily by contracts from the Air Force and other govern187
mental agencies, was pivotal. MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory was also in188
volved, with the Lab receiving half of its funding from ARPA.
For the network to meet its full potential, the military needed it
to grow exponentially. By design, ARPANET’s designers and users
intended that “its techniques would be discussed in professional forums, taught in computer science departments, and implemented in
189
commercial systems.” The National Science Foundation took control of the Internet in the 1980s, and subsequently turned the net183

ABBATE, supra note 177 at 11 (“A distributed system would have many switching
nodes, and many links attached to each node. The redundancy would make it harder to cut off service to users.”).
184
Id. at 2.
185
Id. at 47.
186
See id. at 10, 44.
187
Id. at 10.
188
See id. at 44.
During this time, several universities began building their own computer networks to aid research. George Strawn, currently the Chief Information Officer at NSF, was a computer scientist at the University of
Iowa in the 1970s. He and colleagues at other universities saw the potential that computer networks had to offer as they began to use email
and other innovations. At the same time, the development of micro
computers meant that universities were moving away from large research computers in favor of many smaller computers dispersed
around campus. This posed a problem for researchers who still
needed access to faster, stronger computers and it opened an opportunity to expand fledging networks to more and more users.
NSF and the Birth of the Internet, NAT’L SCIENCE FOUND., http://www.nsf.gov/
news/special_reports/nsf-net/textonly/70s.jsp (last updated Mar. 23, 2009). Thus
universities were ripe for participation in the new Internet once ARPANET went national.
189
ABBATE, supra note 177, at 81.
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work over to private businesses in the 1990s. Once the framework
was in place, the strategy was to allow the profit-driven private sector
191
and educational institutions to drive further development.
The
current form of the Internet, as an almost organic nervous system of
computer networks, is the fruit of the seeds planted by the federally
192
funded Internet development programs.
In a very real sense, the Internet now functions as a marketplace
involving the commerce of ideas and goods and services between parties located in different states and in different countries. The Constitution allows Congress to regulate commerce among the several states
193
as well as with foreign nations. Courts have consistently found that
transmission of information via the Internet is the equivalent of inter194
Therefore, under the express grant of powers to
state commerce.
Congress under the constitution, Congress can regulate the Internet.
The Constitution also grants Congress the power to establish
195
post offices and post roads. Arguably, the power to establish an “Internet” could be implied from that grant of power, though such a
thing did not exist at the founding. If the authors of the Constitution
put enough priority on communication between citizens to make the
creation of a post office an enumerated power of Congress, logically,

190
“The National Science Foundation (NSF) is an independent federal agency
created by Congress in 1950 ‘to promote the progress of science; to advance the national health, prosperity, and welfare; to secure the national defense . . .’ With an
annual budget of about $6.9 billion (FY 2010), [the NSF is] the funding source for
approximately 20 percent of all federally supported basic research conducted by
America’s colleges and universities. In many fields such as mathematics, computer
science and the social sciences, NSF is the major source of federal backing.” See
About the NSF, NAT’L SCIENCE FOUND., http://www.nsf.gov/about (last updated Apr. 7,
2010).
191
ABBATE, supra note 177, at 81.
192
Indeed, ARPA is still involved in advancing the Internet’s development. In
December 2009 ARPA gave away a $40,000 prize as part of their Network Challenge,
involving a nationwide hunt for large red balloons designed to study the effects of
social networking and the Internet on “the timely communication, wide-area teambuilding, and urgent mobilization required to solve broad-scope, time-critical problems.” DARPA Network Challenge, DARPA, https://networkchallenge.darpa.mil/
Default.aspxhttps://networkchallenge.darpa.mil/Default.aspxhttps://network
challenge.darpa.mil/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 31, 2011).
193
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
194
See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 706 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that
a combined computer/telephone system constituted a facility and means of interstate commerce); United States v. Carroll, 105 F.3d 740, 742 (1st Cir. 1997) (“Transmission of photographs by means of the Internet is tantamount to moving photographs across state lines and thus constitutes transportation in interstate
commerce.”).
195
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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if the technology was available at the time to create a medium capable of facilitating that communication in a more efficient manner,
the authors would have chosen that medium instead of the mail.
Therefore, even if the DOD did not create ARPANET, Congress
could have created the Internet under the grant of postal power in
Article I, Section 8. Likewise, if Congress can create post offices and
post roads, then Congress impliedly can maintain those roads and offices, regulate their operation, and police the use of the mail for the
196
security of the system.
Extrapolating to the modern form of communication, Congress can regulate the Internet under the same grant
of power.
D. Adjusting § 1717 to Address Internet Speech
Congress should implement a statutory approach to limiting Internet dissemination of inciteful materials on the basis of § 1717.
Like § 1717, the statute should prohibit the posting of materials advocating or urging treason, insurrection, or forcible resistance to any
law of the United States on the Internet. Also like § 1717, this statute
would be constitutional. To avoid invoking Brandenburg’s imminency
requirement, and in the interest of preserving the precious freedom
of speech, the regulation should be narrowly tailored so as not to
sweep too broadly, carefully drawing the distinction between advocating for the use of force or violence in the abstract, and speech intended to incite an immediate use of force or violence.
1.

Proposed Statutory Language

(a) It shall be unlawful to use the Internet to transmit material
advocating or urging treason, insurrection, or forcible resistance
to any law of the United States, where such material creates a substantial likelihood of an imminent threat of such actions upon
viewing by the recipient of such material. Such material shall not
be hosted by any Internet Service Provider.
(b) Whoever uses or attempts to use the Internet for the transmission of any matter declared by this section to be prohibited, shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years or
both.

196
Cf. McCulloch v. Md., 17 U.S. 316, 417 (U.S. 1819) (From the Constitutional
grant of power in Art. 1, § 8, cl. 7 “to establish post offices and post roads” is inferred
the power and duty to carry the mail and punish those who steal it.).
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The Proposed Statute is Constitutional

Masses sets up two threshold questions for applying the First
197
First, is the regulation a reAmendment in this type of situation.
straint prior to publication? Second, is the regulation a postpublication restraint that does not merely burden circulation, but
eliminates it altogether? This proposed statute satisfies both inquiries. For the same reasons that the nonmailability provision is not an
unconstitutional burden on freedom of the press, the proposed regulation of inciteful speech on the Internet is likewise not unconstitutional.
Further, under the reasoning of Rice, the imminence consideration would apply only when inciteful speech is “mere advocacy” and
not to the regulation of speech intended to provoke and aid in violent acts. Thus, the proposed regulation would not invoke Brandenburg, because it does not burden the freedom of speech. If speech
creates a substantial likelihood of an imminent threat, it cannot be
viewed as “mere advocacy” or an abstract idea.
Section 1717 is not a prior restraint on speech. Individuals are
free to print or publish any speech they choose, but if the material
falls under the nonmailable provision, it simply cannot be trans198
ported through the mail.
Likewise, a statute prohibiting insurrectionist materials on the Internet would not be a prior restraint on
speech. It would merely prohibit the use of a particular medium of
communication to disseminate materials advocating for insurrection
or other illegal acts. Just as § 1717 was merely an extension of the
Comstock Act, this would, in essence, be an extension of § 1717 to
cover a mode of communication not contemplated at the time of passage of the statute. Courts, in applying the prohibition, would need
to be careful so as to avoid applying the statute in an overly broad
manner such that it would have a chilling effect on legitimate speech.
In the proposed statutory language, imminence of the threat is
not required. This accounts for the lack of instantaneous communication in most Internet transactions. The types of content that this
language prohibits are very narrow, tracking the language in § 1717.
Because the State has a strong interest in preventing the downfall of
the nation, barring advocacy for treason, insurrection, and forcible
resistance over the Internet should survive judicial scrutiny. In these
ways, this new statute should satisfy the First Amendment generally
and Brandenburg in particular.
197
198

See supra notes 164–68 and accompanying text.
See supra Part IV.A.
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E. Arguments in Support of the New Statute
1.

Failure to Proscribe the Dissemination of
Insurrectionist Materials on the Internet Would
Defeat the Purpose of Section 1717

Section 1717 is a valid restraint on the use of the postal service in
furthering the compelling national interest in preserving the country
and upholding the law. To allow circumvention of this interest by allowing the same materials banned from the mails to be disseminated
on the Internet defeats the entire purpose of § 1717. If a newsletter,
for example, could be precluded from the mail based on inciteful or
insurrectionist materials that are considered a danger to the public
welfare, why allow the same material to be posted on the Internet?
The Internet provides a far greater audience than direct mailing ever
could and at a mere fraction of the cost. The need for § 1717 has not
diminished in the Internet age, but the reach of its protections is not
great enough to fulfill its purpose.
2

The New Statute Will Make Censorship Less Likely

A statutory approach like this could also address the concerns of
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) who have been pressured in recent
years by the government to censor questionable material posted by
199
their customers. Because the ISPs, as companies, do not fall under
the same constitutional restraints as the government, when they re200
The govmove content, no First Amendment right is infringed.
ernment has, according to some commentators, adopted the tactic of
pressuring ISPs into a censorship by proxy role because officials do
not have the direct authority to order the removal of content from
201
the Internet. A statute such as the one proposed here would eliminate this practice, which is looked upon by experts with “a jaundiced
202
eye.”
3.

Application to the Secession Case Study

Governor Perry’s statements about the possibility of secession
203
were vague and noncommittal. He seemed to indirectly address an
abstract idea, which is exactly the kind of speech protected by Bran-

199
200
201
202
203

See Montgomery, supra note 88, at 144.
See id.
See id. at 164–65.
Id. at 165.
See supra notes 20–36 and accompanying text.
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denburg. Were someone to post on the Internet what Governor Perry
said in his Tea Party speeches, that content should be protected.
Daniel Miller, the president of TNM, runs a website on which he
204
expressly calls for Texas to secede from the Union.
He organizes
supporters, disseminates a petition, and posts blog entries in favor of
Texas secession. Miller’s suggestion that U.S. troops would fight
against the U.S. in the event of a war of secession does not really rise
to an effort to incite a violent response. Miller ultimately advocates
for state legislative action to hold a popular referendum on the question of secession. He argues that if the people approve a measure
declaring independence, secession is legal. These, again, are examples of advocacy for ideas, and are protected under Brandenburg.
Even with a less stringent imminency component in the test, Miller’s
message, while urging for a violation of U.S. law, does not call for violence, and is not likely to produce violence. It may even be that Miller’s website is the modern example of Holmes’s “surreptitious pub205
lishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man.”
Therefore, Miller’s
speech should be protected by the First Amendment under an expanded § 1717.
Similarly, Debra Medina’s statements about a “bloody war” merely describe what she thinks might happen in her secessionist vision,
206
and does not call for people to engage in violence or insurrection.
Her arguments regarding nullification are not a call for individuals to
disobey federal law, but rather an expression of the idea that states
have some kind of power under the Constitution to supersede federal
law. Medina’s speech would also be protected by the First Amendment under an expanded § 1717.
207
Larry Kilgore, by contrast, presents a close case. Kilgore openly advocates for an immediate secession from the United States, and
his speech in Austin might be considered by reasonable people to
have been inciteful. One specific posting by Kilgore to the Internet
might fall under a new § 1717 for the Internet. His Veteran’s Day
message was a blatant call for support in a military coup. This is an
effort at direct incitement, and it is certainly an act of speech advocating for insurrection. The likelihood of it being followed is debatable,
but the gravity of the potential harm is immense. With nearly a quarter of a million people voting for Kilgore in a race for national office,

204
205
206
207

See supra Part II.A.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.C.
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208

he can hardly be called “an unknown man.” It is no defense to say
that secession itself is highly unlikely, because an armed attempt at
secession by some disgruntled group or individual is far more likely
than a successful attempt at secession. This is speech that is not protected by Brandenburg, and would be prohibited from the Internet
under the proposed statute.
Finally, Clay Laird should not be permitted to post threats to the
209
Internet. He advocates for violent secession, stating that he is willing to die to achieve it and that those who oppose it will die as well.
The self-titled “Certified Domestic Terrorist” warned Texas residents
that if they did not like the political point of view he was espousing,
they should leave or be driven out, and suggested his manner of
doing so would involve weapons and ammunition. He also stated that
members of the military would assist in a war of secession upon return from deployment overseas. Laird’s statements clearly do not
constitute the advocacy of ideas in the abstract, especially in light of
Laird’s in-person threats at the Capitol. Posting such speech to the
Internet should be restricted, and such speech is not protected under
the First Amendment. If Laird printed these postings out and mailed
them, he would be in violation of § 1717 and subject to criminal penalty. He should not be allowed to skirt the obvious intent of Congress by instead posting them to the Internet, while at the same time
reaching an even bigger potential audience.
V. CONCLUSION
The Internet is a powerful medium of communication, and like
many tools intended to build, it can also be wielded to destroy. Websites promoting violence, hate, insurrection, treason, and other
crimes are freely published under current law. This is a threat to
both national security and personal safety. Terrorists and criminals
utilize this powerful tool to recruit followers and incite action. The
Internet was created by the U.S. government to improve national defense, not to aid violent criminals. A need for regulation of incendiary speech on the Internet exists, and § 1717 provides a constitutional mode to achieve that regulation.
Free speech over the Internet should be protected, but not all
speech falls under the protection of the First Amendment. The
Brandenburg Doctrine is ill-suited to the context of Internet communications. Under a modified version of § 1717, incendiary speech on
208
209

See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.D.
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the Internet could be prohibited without doing damage to the liberty
of the majority of Internet users, who do not advocate or recruit for
violent resistance to U.S. law.
The First Amendment guarantees the right to speak without
prior restraint. It does not exonerate the speaker from all responsibility for the words he chooses. It also does not guarantee equal
access to all available media to spread that speech. A State has a legitimate interest in preserving peace, upholding law, and protecting itself and its citizens from crime and violence. If an act of speech contributes to the likelihood of violence, indeed, when it is intended to
do so, the State has the right to regulate that speech and if it is dangerous enough, to prohibit it altogether. This right of the State,
however, must be exercised with the precision of a surgeon because it
is, after all, an infringement on the absolute liberty of speech. Just as
a surgeon must delicately cut away a cancerous matter without damaging the far greater mass of healthy tissue, so too must a restraint
on speech only dampen or silence the very dangerous, cancerous
speech without harming the very liberty that protects all others. But
make no mistake: the cancer must be removed to preserve the entire
body, or all will die together.

